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In his later political writings, Derrida focused much on the ethical and political question 
of alterity and is well known for his political interventions on behalf of the sans-papiers 
in France. These interventions were guided in particular by an ethics of hospitality which 
he developed through a progressive reading of Kant with Levinas. In an interview in Le 
Monde, Derrida tantalisingly suggests that hospitality is ultimately ‘an art and a poetics, 
yet a whole politics depends on it and a whole ethics is determined through it’ (Derrida 
1997a [Our Translation]). 
 
In this essay, we would like to consider a potential critique of Derrida’s application of an 
ethics of hospitality to a politics. Given that this project started as a debate between the 
authors at the 2007 Critical Legal Conference, it seemed appropriate that the style of the 
essay should follow the excitement of a dialectic that is quasi-Socratic in form. In section 
one, we give an overview of Derrida’s notion of hospitality and then proceed in section 
two to critique the ontological violence in hospitality through the positing of an other 
who rejects hospitality. For this other, we ask why we should pursue hospitality on a 
political level when it would be far less violent to not offer hospitality in the first place. 
The third section serves as a counter-critique or self-critique which focuses on the nature 
of the relation between ethics and politics and the distinction between conceiving the 
other as either transcendent or transimmanent. The concluding section tangentially 
expands on this by looking at the violence endured and the kind of hospitality proffered 
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in order for this essay to come before you as a joint collaboration between two authors 
using the first person plural and which ends with one ‘dissensual’ signature.  
 
DERRIDA AND HOSPITALITY 
 
Derrida’s thinking on hospitality stems from the currently very active debate on the 
question of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism (kosmos: world or universe / polis: city / 
politēs: citizen) as the idea of world citizenship has an ancient heritage. The dominant 
strain of cosmopolitan thinking is based on the idea of human unity within a global 
community. This has given rise to various theories of centralized global governance 
applying cosmopolitan law in the interests of the universal citizen as opposed to 
international law whose primary legal actors are States. The main inspiration for this kind 
of thinking is traditionally credited to Kant who was interested in advancing the cause of 
human progress by working out the best form of global structure that would eliminate the 
threat of war. He concluded that the world should consist of a pacific federation of States 
not bound by contingent agreement (international law of treaties) but by cosmopolitan 
right, thus turning each individual into a ‘citizen of a universal state of mankind’ (Kant 
1970, 99). While an international State of a world republic was considered desirable 
insofar as it extricated mankind from the savagery of an international arena that subsisted 
in a war-like state of nature, Kant was also mindful of the sacredness of the sovereign 
will of the nation State and its right not to be coerced into entering any such world 
republic. The compromise was to limit cosmopolitan right to the condition of universal 
hospitality, meaning ‘the right of the stranger not to be treated with hostility when he 
arrives on someone else’s territory’ (ibid, 105). 
 
Derrida draws inspiration from this notion of hospitality and derives from it a significant 
body of political and ethical thought that goes beyond orthodox cosmopolitanism. For 
Derrida, unconditional or pure hospitality is the absolute welcoming of the other, a 
categorical imperative that says, ‘yes to who or what turns up, before any anticipation, 
before any identification, whether or not it has to do with a foreigner, an immigrant, an 
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invited guest, or an unexpected visitor, whether or not the new arrival is a citizen of 
another country, a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or 
female’ (Derrida 2000, 77). At the same time, Derrida draws our attention to two limits to 
universal hospitality that Kant himself imposed in virtue of the fact that the surface of the 
earth is a limited space which must be held in common possession, that is to say, ‘no one 
can in principle, therefore, legitimately appropriate for himself the aforementioned 
surface (as such, as a surface-area) and withhold access to another man’ (Derrida 2001, 
20). The first limit to universal hospitality is its exclusion of the right to residence. 
Hospitality only goes so far as the right of visitation, the right to present oneself to 
another. The second limit to hospitality is its dependence on state sovereignty: 
‘hospitality signifies here the public nature (publicité) of public space, as is always the 
case for the juridical in the Kantian sense; hospitality, whether public or private, is 
dependent on and controlled by the law and the state police’ (ibid). Both conditional and 
unconditional hospitality are paradoxical imperatives. Conditional hospitality is not ‘true’ 
hospitality because it is given only on expectation of a return or offered out of decorum 
and therefore without responsibility. Unconditional hospitality, which is the ‘truest’ 
hospitality, is at the same time impossible because in practice one can always be more 
generous, more welcoming and give more of oneself and one’s home until there is 
complete self-effacement. Hospitality subsists somewhere between certain finite 
conditions and the purely unconditional. Although conditional and unconditional 
hospitality work in tension with each other, this does not mean hospitality is self-
defeating, caught unproductively up a blind alley. On the contrary, this tension 
constitutes the properly political dimension of hospitality: 
 
It is a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and of 
knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space which takes 
place between the Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered a priori to every 
other, to all newcomers, whoever they may be, and the conditional laws of a right 
to hospitality, without which The unconditional Law of hospitality would be in 
danger of remaining a pious and irresponsible desire, without form and without 
potency, and of even being perverted at any moment. (ibid, 22–23). 
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Whether the law of hospitality can be definitively improved or whether improvement is 
always something yet to be done is a question of the negotiation between universal and 
particular demands. While the idea of negotiating between conditional and unconditional 
hospitality can certainly produce outcomes, this does not mean it can provide ultimate 
solutions. The inherent tension guarantees there are no final solutions and any act of 
hospitality, in some way, always leaves itself open to a certain risk. Exposing oneself to 
the other, to difference, risks turning into an interrogation, aggressive self-protection and 
the guarding of the borders of the State as well as one’s sense of identity. Moreover, since 
the negotiation occurs between two antinomic imperatives, the tension between them 
means that hospitality can easily cross over into hostility. John Caputo notes from one of 
Derrida’s unpublished seminars that this tension is also revealed etymologically: ‘The 
word “hospitality” derives from the Latin hospes, which is formed from hostis, which 
originally meant a “stranger” and came to take on the meaning of the enemy or “hostile” 
stranger (hostilis), + pets (potis, potes, potentia), to have power’ (Caputo 1997, 110). Any 
act of hospitality contains within it a trace of hostility, ‘the welcome of the guest, is a 
function of the power of the host to remain master of the premises’ (ibid). Moreover, 
within the notion of the ‘host’ there is also the idea of the ‘hostage’.  In retaining the 
sovereign power to lay down the conditions of hospitality, the host in effect keeps his 
guest hostage to his preconditions, a prisoner of their encounter. Even within pure 
hospitality lies a trace of the hostage. If one relinquishes sovereignty over the home and 
bids the other to ‘ “come inside”, “come with me”, not only toward me, but within me: 
occupy me, take place in me, which means, by the same token, also take my place, don’t 
content yourself with coming to meet me or “into my home” ’, then what happens is a 
paradoxical substitution of host and hostage (Derrida 2000, 123). It would be as if the 
master waiting by the door for his guest is in fact the hostage of his own power, a 
prisoner of his own domain, a victim of his own subjectivity. He thus awaits the liberator 
and the substitution occurs, the hostage becomes the host. But if the host becomes the 
hostage, and the former hostage (i.e. the guest) becomes the host, an infinite cycle takes 
place wherein the positions of both host and hostage are simultaneously assumed. Derrida 
concludes, “these substitutions make everyone into everyone else’s hostage” (ibid, 124). 
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Equally it might be said that these substitutions make everyone into everyone else’s host. 
As a host we contain something of the stranger, the guest and even, fleetingly, 
necessarily, substitute ourselves for the other at the point of pure hospitality. Derrida 
focuses instead on a structural impossibility that is itself the aporetic condition of the 
possible. Absolute hospitality is absolutely impossible, yet without it there is no 
hospitality and thus no cosmopolitanism. 
 
Derrida therefore does not criticize Kant for limiting universal hospitality. On the 
contrary, he sees nothing fortuitous in “the one who destroys at its source the very 
possibility of what he posits and determines in this way” (ibid, 71). For Kant the guest is 
always a foreigner and sets up his relationship to him as a matter of law. Derrida concurs 
and draws from this the limit of hospitality that must operate everywhere, that is to say, 
the necessity of a border that operates as a line behind which to negotiate with the other 
(in State terms this border acts as the natural control point of the flow of immigration) 
(Derrida 1999, 90). At the same time, Derrida reinterprets the Kantian necessity for 
conditional hospitality within a framework that does not simply posit legal rights of 
visitation but that constitutes the political tension and the (in)justice of the decision 
between conditional and unconditional hospitality. This is why Derrida avers that 
deconstruction is hospitality: ‘Hospitality is the deconstruction of the at-home; 
deconstruction is hospitality to the other, to the other than oneself, the other that its 
“other,” to an other that is beyond any “its other” ’ (Derrida 2002, 364). Instead of the 
nihilistic, apolitical and irresponsible practice with which it is sometimes charged, 
deconstruction is the affirmation of life, a responsible reflection and welcoming of the 
other that amounts to nothing less than an originary ethics. 
 
The clear parallel is with Derrida’s other famous pair of binary imperatives: law and 
justice. In his seminal essay ‘The Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority’, 
Derrida states unequivocally, ‘deconstruction is justice’ (ibid, 243).  He distinguishes the 
exercise of justice as ‘law, legitimacy or legality, a stabilizable, statutory and calculable 
apparatus, a system of regulated and coded prescriptions’  from justice as ‘infinite, 
incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic’ 
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(ibid, 250), that is, justice as the ‘experience of the impossible’ (ibid, 244). Law is to 
justice as conditional hospitality is to pure hospitality. If pure justice and pure hospitality 
are experiences of the impossible, then it is precisely this impossibility that leaves open 
the call to justice and the need for hospitality. Crucially and at the same time, the 
impossibility of a fully just law and the impossibility of ever achieving pure hospitality 
means there will always be the unavoidable injustice of inhospitality that is the structural 
violence of the encounter with the other. 
 
It is not, however, simply the case that that we are left abandoned to the injustice of 
inhospitality, with no further recourse than to play out our responsibility to the other 
through a response to the call of pure hospitality. Since hospitality is in fact always a 
failure of hospitality––a hostile violence in the substitution between host and guest––
there is also always at play a scene of forgiveness. Not only must the host forgive the 
guest his encroachment in order for there to be a welcoming, the host must beg 
forgiveness of the guest for his failure and for his violence in never being welcoming 
enough. To welcome the other is never to be ready for the other and to always be 
surprised by the other since the other is by definition unforeseeable, unknown, and 
strange. ‘I am always, if I can say so, always and structurally, lacking, at fault, and 
therefore condemned to be forgiven, or rather to have to ask for forgiveness for my lack 
of preparation, for an irreducible and constitutive unpreparedness’ (ibid, 381).  Yet 
forgiveness, like decision, operates on a plane of mad hyperbole. For there to be true 
forgiveness, there must be the impossible forgiving of the unforgivable, just like for there 
to be responsible decision, there must be the experience of the undecidable. Moreover, 
one can never offer forgiveness, for this presumes the ‘haughty’ power to pardon that 
reintroduces a sovereign act of violence (ibid, 389). Instead one must beg forgiveness in 
cognizance of what Heidegger termed the ‘debt’ or ‘guilt’ (schuldig) that corresponds to 
the originary lack in being (Dasein) insofar as it never possesses itself in virtue of its 
‘thrownness’ (ibid, 383). Conversely, the one who forgives must do the impossible––he 
or she must forgive the unforgivable fact of one’s existence with others. This is an 
aporetic act that must both be expressed yet also remain silent. It must be expressed 
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because forgiveness means nothing unless it is known and it must remain silent because 
any expression of it risks driving it back into the economy of a gift that is offered in 
expectation of a grateful return (ibid, 399). Ultimately, hospitality and the forgiveness of 
its violence can only be fully experienced as a mad test or ordeal within the power 
relation between host and guest. For Derrida, what remains to be thought, indeed what 
remains hopeful in this thought, is the possibility of the disassociation of unconditionality 
from sovereignty that is the possibility of ‘forgiveness without power’ (Derrida 2001, 
59).  
 
A CRITIQUE OF HOSPITALITY 
 
We have already intimated that Derrida’s hospitality may represent an ‘originary ethics’. 
By ‘ethics’ we do not here refer to a moral code, as if one had the choice one way or 
another. Rather, as originary, these ethics are a pre-political aspect of the human 
condition. In venturing a critique now, what we are specifically concerned with is the 
manner in which the difference between ethical hospitality and political hospitality 
reveals a challenge for the notion of hospitality as such, exemplarily drawn out when it 
comes to particular categories of recipients.  
 
Hospitality as an originary ethics is a concept that was clearly influenced by Derrida’s 
friend, Emmanuel Levinas. (For instance, Derrida’s essay, ‘A Word of Welcome’, in the 
eulogistic volume Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, enthusiastically reads Levinas’ Totality 
and Infinity to be nothing short of an ‘immense treatise of hospitality’ (Derrida 1999, 21)) 
Therefore, a brief digression into Levinas’ philosophy will allow us to understand better 
how and why hospitality is described as ‘ethical’, and why sensitivity to the 
ethics/politics distinction is important. His philosophy was born out of a critique of 
Martin Heidegger, whose well known revolutionary intellectual manoeuvre was to reduce 
the question of metaphysics to a question of Being. Such an inquiry, known as 
‘ontology’, identifies the human subject to be always-already thrown into a situation of 
the world’s Being. Authentic subjectivity (Dasein) is that which questions its own Being 
in world. As thrown into its worldly situation, the subject already has a ‘pre-ontological’ 
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sense of its Being, this being the condition of the ontological enquiry, and it is precisely 
the irreducibly circular temporality of this relation that famously introduces time into 
Heidegger’s proposition.† Levinas’ critique is to disagree with Heidegger’s idea that 
freedom and authenticity are found in Being itself. For Levinas, ontology is falsely 
dependent on the totality of Being: its lack of an outside, or an other. On the contrary, he 
argues, freedom and authenticity are not found in the inquiry into what merely is. Rather, 
the human subject aspires to the what-is-not, that which is ‘otherwise than Being’. 
Constitutive of our subjectivity is the desire to escape Being, which is characterised as 
burdensome, as if one’s ‘thrownness’ into the world indicates the very nature of one’s 
enchainment to oneself and to existence itself. Against the Heideggerian position, then, 
Totality and Infinity argues that subjectivity is fundamentally welcoming to the other. 
Levinas poses the subject that emerges from the Being of the world using the metaphor of 
the dwelling: a structure that can close itself off from the world in order to be for-itself, 
yet is at the same time inherently open and hospitable (Levinas 1969, 148). This is 
justified by his exposition of the encounter with the other person revealing a different 
dynamic to inhabitation and possession, by calling its absoluteness into question: ‘The 
Other—the absolutely other—paralyzes possession, which he contests by his epiphany in 
the face’ (ibid, 171). As the dwelling is the site of ontology, where the being’s Being in 
the world produces meaning by allowing possession, this is shattered by the other’s 
contestation of ownership. Totality is broken by the non-totalisable Infinity that the other 
embodies, demanding of the subject a non-violent approach that welcomes them, without 
assimilation or reduction. This command of non-violence is the basis of ethics (ibid, 199-
200). 
 
This digression allows us to postulate the idea that ethics is not reducible to morality, law 
or politics, but is anteriorly embedded at the heart of the human condition. The ethical 
welcome occurs prior to choice: it is unconditional. The realms of morality, law and 
politics are all areas of choice that become applicable after ethics. Under this 
                                                
† For an introductory exposition of Heidegger’s argument see: Heidegger, Martin. 1993. Being and Time: 
Introduction. In Basic Writings: Revised and Expanded Edition, ed. David Farrell Krell, 37-87. London: 
Routledge. 
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interpretation, unconditional hospitality may therefore be understood as an irrecusable 
originary ethics (as the originary ethics), opposed to the conditional hospitality of politics 
where the dilemmas of choice, limits and finitude arise. Put otherwise, unconditional 
hospitality refers to a structuring debt to the other at the foundation of human 
subjectivity; conditional hospitality refers to political hospitality in a visible, empirical 
sense, at the level of rights, borders, citizenship, and so on. The time comes when one has 
to choose: when one is faced with more than one ethical demand. This situation is ‘the 
limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: What do I have to do with justice?’ 
(Levinas 1998, 157). This is, in other words, the birth of politics, where unconditional 
ethical hospitality meets its frontier, and decisions and principles are required within the 
multiplicity. Therefore, whilst separated and irreducible to each other, ethics and politics 
may inform one another. As Simon Critchley puts it, ‘[i]f ethics without politics is empty, 
then politics without ethics is blind’ (Critchley 1999, 283). 
 
Although ethically it is unconditional, one cannot say that at the political level hospitality 
is always the right choice, because one cannot be hospitable to all. Indeed, Levinas was 
acutely aware of the harsh reality of politics. In a notorious radio interview, when asked 
whether the Palestinian is, for the Israeli, the deserving other par excellence, he said the 
following: 
 
 [I]f your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you 
 do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or 
 at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is 
 wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (Levinas 
 1989, 294). 
 
Whilst at the heart of humanity is an originary ethics, a subjective welcoming of the other 
person, this does not negate the necessity of politics in all its coldness and brutality. The 
issue, then, at the core of this critique, is Derrida’s pursuance of hospitality at this 
political level. Does this not over-simplify the political problematic, revealing a 
questionable assumption that all people desire (political) hospitality, and that the latter is 
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the most appropriate political strategy? Is there a situation in which the ethical demand 
requires a non-hospitable response at the level of politics? The decline of the nation state 
and the contemporary prevalence of ‘refugees of every kind, immigrants with or without 
citizenship, exiled or forced from their homes, whether with or without papers’ heighten 
Derrida’s interest in hospitality, and helps to justify his preoccupation (Derrida 1999, 71). 
But this is to characterise the other in a particular way: migratory; stateless and, crucially, 
seeking a home. Within the context of refugee politics, this is clearly appropriate. But 
against a generalisation of the category of the other, we pose an alternative exemplar: the 
other that does not desire hospitality. This alterity is embodied by the person who wants 
to resist political inclusion. Whilst such an other would necessarily still provoke the 
unconditional hospitality of originary ethics, it is clear that it is no longer appropriate in 
their case to promote hospitality at the political level. As David Gauthier has emphasised, 
a politics of hospitality would presume a universal fraternity, a kinship and co-belonging. 
And, as he notes, surely the absolute other would be beyond fraternity itself. In this case, 
then, there can be only two alternatives when hospitality becomes the dominant political 
imperative: 
 
Either one can remain outside the community, or one can seek to become 
assimilated into it. In the former instance, the Other remains outside the 
community’s warm embrace. In the latter, the Other is absorbed into the 
community, and its otherness is eliminated. In both cases, the Other is totalized. 
(Gauthier 2007, 178). 
 
In other words, the other is either given hospitality that it does not desire, and is therefore 
assimilated into a fraternity to which it does not belong, or it is left out, which 
presumably undermines hospitality as a locus for politics. In either case, hospitality 
reveals its own violence (and we must stress again that by violence we mean ontological 
violence: the failure of ethics as the reduction of absolute otherness to the language of the 
same, to whatever extent). 
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The critique being made of Derrida here is perhaps one of emphasis. He was undoubtedly 
aware, as the last section has observed, of the inherent hostility of hospitality. But with 
this in mind, we ask why he championed it as a political strategy, as well as a mere 
descriptive account of an originary ethics. When one shifts attention away from the 
refugee and toward the other who does not desire inclusion, the violence of hospitality is 
rendered inescapably visible. And to welcome, in this scene, demonstrates a different 
type of violence, for the failure of hospitality is not that one is not hospitable enough but, 
paradoxically, that one has been hospitable at all. To welcome, and indeed to say 
anything, to engage the other in dialogue, is to say too much, to reduce alterity to the 
sameness of language. This is a violence that cannot be answered fully with the idea of 
forgiveness, because here forgiveness itself reveals a similar violence: the aspiration to 
dialogue, and a demand for interaction with an other that prefers to be left alone. Whilst 
we are told that it is necessary to impose limits, would Derrida go so far to say that 
conditional hospitality is not merely a requirement to maintain limits and order, but also 
offers the possibility of judging whether the other wants hospitality in the first place? 
Whilst he was clearly aware that the scene of forgiveness and hospitality contains its own 
violence and impossibility, it could be suggested that, in some cases, these are the wrong 
goals, even as aporias. Forgiveness seeks a bond, a touch, a linguistic recognition and, 
ultimately, the redemption of the wrong-doer. Might we suggest that in certain situations, 
such as the quiet provocation of the other that resists inclusion, one cannot honestly seek 




To recap, at the ethical level the infinite asymmetry between same and other means the 
other is always demanding and can never be sated.  Yet on the political level, where one 
makes concrete decisions as to how to address the other, the other can cease to demand 
hospitality. When this happens, unnecessary violence occurs when one offers hospitality 
to an other that wants nothing of it. But even though the other may cease to demand 
hospitality, does this mean the other ceases to demand tout court at the political level? If 
so, this would suggest, contra Derrida, that ethics has ceased to guide politics, amounting 
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to a form of politics devoid of ethics, one that would apparently be a more liberating 
position than to be enchained within a ‘fraternity’ (a term Derrida has approached 
cautiously and critically in the past (Derrida 1997b, 138-170)) of which one wants 
nothing of. In other words, there must be some form of demand made by the other at this 
political level, lest politics become a banal form of management and calculation, free 
from the penetrating demand of ethics. The ultimate danger of this position is that it looks 
suspiciously close to neo-liberal individualism, in which authentic political activity is 
sacrificed in the name of the market and freedom of (consumer) choice.  
 
This end result, of course, is not our intention. To clarify this we need to focus on the 
motivating concern of this essay: the infinite debt to the other. A common way to think 
the relation with the other is to pose the other as transcendent, in a position of absolute 
alterity. Thus, when it is conceived ontologically it is reduced in a manoeuvre of violent 
assimilation. This sort of interpretation is commonly associated with Levinas’ work.‡  
Alternatively, one can conceive the other as transimmanent, a term taken from Jean-Luc 
Nancy (Nancy 1997, 55). Transimmanence refers to the amorphous line between 
immanence and transcendence, interiority and exteriority. This line is not only a finite 
borderline that separates, it is also an infinite lack of infinite separation that exposes the 
elements of community. In this way, the other elusively distinguishes itself from the same 
while simultaneously haunting the same from within. This way of thinking alterity can 
also be attributed to Derrida. For him, community is ‘com-mon auto-immunity’ or ‘auto-
co-immunity’, where the attempt to protect the identity or integrity of community––its 
                                                
‡ For instance, see the following passage of Adriaan Peperzak’s: “The Other…does not fit into my 
consciousness; it breaks through my circular or elliptic horizon, thus revealing his/her transcendence. As 
transcendent, the Other responds to the desire that opens my interiority to an absolute exteriority. The Other 
is, thus, the epiphany of a transcendent otherness or absoluteness” (Peperzak 1997, 32). However, insofar 
that Levinas believes that the provocation of the other is embedded in the heart of the human subject, he is 
able to say that the human subject is structured as “the other in the same” (Levinas 1998, 25). What is 
revealed by this is the manner in which Levinas’ philosophy could be considered transimmanent in a 
manner somewhat different to that found in Nancy’s work, separated from the latter by his fierce critique of 
Heidegger. Such a question goes beyond the scope of this article, however. 
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immanence––is destructively compromised by the very protection mechanisms it sets up 
(Derrida 2002, 87). This is because the mechanism that protects the identity of a 
community through ensuring an ultimate identification with it, must do so by appealing to 
something more that community. Those willing to die for their country only do so 
because their country is worth more than life and has a value that transcends its 
boundaries. At the same time, this appeal to the outside of community in order to 
maintain its inside creates a gaping hole in the boundary. This boundary thus begins to 
resemble an invisible force field whose enormous power springs from a transcendent 
fantasy. 
 
Even more directly, it is clear that Derrida understood the self or the ‘one’ as violently 
contaminated by the other:  
 
L’Un se garde de l’autre, The One guards against/keeps some of the other. It 
protects itself from the other, but, in the movement of this jealous violence, it 
comprises in itself, thus guarding it, the self-otherness or self-difference (the 
difference from within oneself) which makes it One. The ‘One differing, deferring 
from itself’. The One as the Other … . L’Un se fait violence. (Derrida 1995, 78). 
 
This constitution of the self follows the same structure as the constitution of community, 
that is to say, the self is subject to an auto-immune mechanism where its attempt to 
protect itself from the other also serves to violently undermine it. The self is a self only 
because it is in intimate relation with the other, a self which is transimmanently ‘one as 
the other’.  
 
This difference between transcendental separation and the transimmanence of the ‘one as 
the other’ has significant implications. For the former, we have an overbearing emphasis 
on the absolute other at the expense of the ‘other as the same’. This emphasis is made in 
an attempt to protect the other from what we called ontological violence, the reduction of 
the other to the same. The problem is that in order to do this, we may have ended up 
creating an excessively transcendental figure in the other that resists inclusion, such that 
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nothing one can do, nothing one can say, nothing one can beg, least of all forgiveness, 
would constitute even a minimally appropriate ethical gesture. There is a sense of ethical 
paralysis here. Moreover such uncompromised transcendentalism risks mirroring the 
same excessive ontological violence that we sought to reduce. This is especially so when 
the only thing that such an other might accept is the murderous death of the ‘one’ so that 
it can preserve its peace in isolation.  
 
One ‘solution’ would be to insist that the ethics of hospitality should remain a purely 
ethical position and have nothing to do with politics.  On the correspondingly pure 
political level, violence can be minimised through choice. In other words, choosing not to 
engage with an other who wants nothing of you minimises the political violence towards 
the other. Hence we can make a distinction between the necessity of ontological violence 
in the encounter with others and the avoidance of political violence that arises through a 
matter of choice. But if we separate ethics from politics in this way are we not simply left 
with the end of authentic political activity mentioned above?  
 
With a transimmanent rather than a transcendental mode of thinking, it is possible to 
conceive other communities and other ‘selves’ as exposed to each other. This is a 
necessary corrective to pure transcendentalism and was a position that Levinas himself 
was tending towards when he wrote that ‘subjectivity is the other in the same’ and that 
this ‘subjectivity is the restlessness of the same disturbed by the other’ (Levinas 1998, 
25). Yet Levinas does not go as far as Derrida, in that Derrida emphasizes not merely the 
other in the same but also the same as the other (alternatively, one might risk saying that 
whereas Levinas was preoccupied with the theme of otherwise than Being, Derrida was 
mindful of the otherwise as Being). This stronger transimmanence helps to shift the focus 
from the duality of an outside on the inside to the aporia of the infinitely differantiated 
singularity. It recognises the auto-immunity of the violent relation between singular 
alterities. This does not lead to an ethics without violence or a pacifist politics, as if one 
could somehow suspend the violence or struggle upon the encounter with the other, but it 
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can call one to responsibility for other ‘ones’ in a manner that ultimately links the ethical 
to the political.  
 
While Derrida notes a hiatus in Levinas’ thought as regards the link between ethics and 
politics, he nonetheless conceives this hiatus as a hopeful silence. There can be no 
classical foundation upon which a determinate content to politics can be deduced from 
ethics, which is why ethics remains silent about it. Yet this also means that the necessary 
relation between ethics and politics, from which ‘it is necessary to deduce a politics and a 
law from ethics’ is more sophisticated than has hitherto been understood in the classical 
manner (Derrida 1999, 115). Strictly speaking then, hospitality in this sense is an ethico-
political gesture that derives from the necessity to combine conditionality with 
unconditionality, without which hospitality would be an empty and worthless concept. 
Hospitality welcomes and receives the other as a reflection of the need to ‘begin by 
responding’ (ibid, 24). Instead of prescribing a given content to politics, ethics imputes an 
infinite responsibility to the political decision, a responsibility that is always a response to 
the call or the demand of the other.  This is why Derrida makes it a necessary ethical 
injunction at the political level. Where the other demands to be left alone, hospitality can 
respond by acquiescing to this demand. Saying ‘okay’ to the other who wants no 
hospitality is exemplary of hospitality itself. Although such an address to the other 
reduces its alterity and leads to violence, we must not forget that it is the other that 
demands to be addressed in the first place. This of course leads to its own violence as 
Derrida has admitted, but this appears no more violent than the positing of the 
transcendental other who rejects hospitality. The other never ceases to demand, even 
when it is a demand for the rejection of hospitality; and in the response to this demand a 
decision must be taken, informed by a welcoming of the other that is shrouded in 




Across critique and counter-critique, we argue that—whether conceptualised as an ethical 
or a political demand—hospitality is in some way ineluctable. Like many of Derrida’s 
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favoured notions, it is structured by aporia. The most immediately striking of these 
aporias is its dichotomy of conditional and unconditional hospitality, whereby conditional 
laws are necessary to give effect to unconditional hospitality whilst simultaneously 
betraying the latter by their limits (Derrida 2000, 77). Both conditional and unconditional 
hospitality need each other, and are denied by each other. But as well as this, we argue 
that there is a further aporia, which arises (or perhaps is merely rendered more visible) 
when hospitality can only be pursued by renouncing itself. There are, we argue, certain 
situations where the demand placed by the other is, inescapably, for one to desist from 
hospitality, and as such the unconditional hospitable answer must undo itself. These 
situations are exemplified by the possibility of the other that does not want inclusion. In 
this scene, hospitality must directly face its own violence. The first aporia tells us that 
hospitality is never enough: one can always be more hospitable, and one never truly 
meets the demand of the other. This self-contradiction and this impossibility reaches its 
zenith in the second aporia, which manifests when hospitality must deny itself. This is the 
absolute limit point of hospitality’s self-contradiction, where it must not only recognise 
the residue of violence that is necessitated by its structural impossibility, but furthermore, 
it is revealed to be violence itself. This would be to conceive of the political situation 
where hospitality and violence become indistinguishable. 
 
Derrida takes a position that is in one sense the inverse of Kant’s. Whereas Kant held that 
the natural situation is one of war, and that law is required to institute peace, Derrida 
holds that peace, as the pacifistic welcoming of the other, is the originary relation. 
However, even war and violence must still presuppose and bear the trace of hospitality 
(Derrida 1999, 90); and politics, even when unavoidably brutal, is still guided by ethics. 
Similarly, in Politics of Friendship, Derrida counsels the reader that in the field of the 
political, ‘the enemy can hate or wage war on me in the name of friendship, for 
Friendship’s sake, out of friendship for friendship’ (Derrida 1997b, 72). In other words, 
against the tradition of political theory exemplified by Carl Schmitt, enmity is not the 
irreducible determinant of the political. Rather, it is one particular strategy or effect, built 
upon the true foundation: the possibility of friendship. In a similar vein, we suggest that 
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in the name of hospitality, obligated by the unconditional demand to respond and to be 
responsible, one must, if the situation demands, refuse hospitality. This renunciation is, 
predictably by now, impossible. The effect is that hospitality becomes its own torsion, 
turning itself inside out, attempting to disavow itself for the sake of itself. One is here 
reminded of Levinas’ account of ethical subjectivity, toward which Derrida paid no small 
amount of admiration in the development of his notion of hospitality. Levinas tells us that 
the subject is both constituted and undone in the relation with the other because, 
paradoxically, only a separated being can exist for the other. In this contradictory 
constitution of the subject, as the ‘anguish of contraction and breakup’ (Levinas 1998, 
108), the ‘contraction’ signifies a ‘recurrence to oneself out of an irrecusable exigency of 
the other’ (ibid, 109). Does this not indicate that ethics or hospitality cannot be pure 
devotion or welcoming, and that they require, or require the recognition of, separation? 
Just as the autonomous egotic self must undo itself in identification of its debt to the 
other, so too the absolutely selfless gesture of heteronomous hospitality must undo it-
‘self’, signalling the return to the self. 
 
Conveniently, the production of this article serves as something of a performative 
metaphor of the argument with which we conclude. This piece was (thankfully) not born 
out of consensus, but a productive debate that, we hope, has continued without being 
reconciled in its committal from words to paper. This process of writing has, we realise, 
raised many of the dilemmas of borders and hospitality that we have discussed 
substantively. How, for example, do two authors say some-thing without assimilation, 
and so without becoming one singular author? In other words, how do we articulate a 
point or an argument whilst still retaining our independent authorship? Co-authorship 
occurs at the threshold between, on the one hand, absolute separation, and on the other 
hand, absolute consensus or assimilation. In the same way that Kant conceived the world 
as a finite globe that we must share as members of a grand cosmopolitical constellation, 
this essay represents a more modest finite space, a microcosm that two authors inhabit. In 
openly confronting each other within a single work, a dissensus has been exposed that 
may not have been so palpable if there had been a statement of positions in two 
independent contributions. Here we hope we have demonstrated the necessity to address 
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each other as each other’s other, being forced to respond in virtue of the ineluctable 
exigency of hospitality. And here, quite clearly, the violence of hospitality shows itself. 
For each of us must bear each other, respond to each, and in doing so hospitality demands 
that we interpret each other and influence each other, integrating each other’s thought 
into our own, and vice versa. This must occur even in the most sympathetic of dialogues. 
At the same time, in order to ensure a genuine co-authorship (the co-authenticity of a 
signature that is either the two within one or the two as one) we must seek, to some 
extent, to retain our separation and forgive each other, as far as possible, for the violence 
we have inescapably inflicted. But to say that this piece has been written out of dissensus 
is hopefully not to undermine the meaning it carries. We may be so bold as to suggest 
that we have merely replicated the torsion at the heart of all writing, even in that of the 
most solitary author. For all writing not only presupposes a reader, but is demanded by 
this reader, who has provoked the author into action. Writing, no less at the service of 
originary ethics than any other aspect of human activity, begins with hospitality, with the 
ineluctable indebtedness one holds towards the other, and the demand to respond. In the 
situation we find ourselves in, the time comes when the most hospitable response is to 
reject hospitality in the name of hospitality, and to maintain or even reinstate division, 
and therefore to allow the co-author to continue to be an author. We, the co-authors, must 
nonetheless end by signing. And in so doing, it is the grammatical ‘we’ who sign in the 
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